#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 1:

p. 5-6: "the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what ... not being ... performed or are not being adequately performed. Based on these determinations, the Director ... may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally."

- 1. This may be reflection of my own ignorance, but might not a mention of the circumstances of the establishment of ORE be appropriate here. Apparently, framxthexumx on the basis of above underscoring, IAB approval was necessary. Is this right? ORE was established, yet (p. 7) the agencies "were dismayed at the establishment of an intelligence research activity in Central Intelligence". Did the DCI just establish it, or what? I don't mean that there should be a long discourse on this, but the question does arise in my mind under what circumstances was it established?
- p. 6: line 6 from bottom: paraphernalia.
- p. 6: See point raised above. "This decision of the NIA" on July 19 to estab. ORE. Was this decision routine or the result of dispute between DCI and IAB? Or did the IAB simply go along with the DCI. If the NIA decided the matter, it would seem that there was dispute, see NIA Directive No. 1 on DCI-IAB relations.
- p. 12: line 9 from bankame bottom: Scandinavia.

p. 34: bottom of page. Summary of IPB. Contradiction here? - might well have been the answer to review question of had been seriously adopted. Then - it is improbable that it would have succeeded if tried.

p. 3 (in Appendix): line 3 from top: Scandinavia.

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT only, for the use of DCI/HS.

The record copy has been released to National Archives under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Date 3 DAN 91 HRP 89-2

-866666351

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 3 JAN91 BRP 89-2

000031

- 1. p. 1: Although there is a footnote listed on footnote sheet for this page there is no number on the page itself. I would judge that it is supposed to come at the end of paragraph 1.
- 2. p. 4: bottom of page: "to the detriment of its main function", over to top of p. 5. I realize that one of ORE difficulties was precisely that the question of what was its function. However, it seems to me that this part (looking at it as an outsider) would be strengthened by a restatement (summary) and comment on the section which you have on p. 8 (I believe) of Paper Number 1 the section in which you state the function of ORE. This might serve to emphasize the whole problem.
- 3. p. 8: Would not the point discussed in connection with p. 4 also apply here? "it had been allowed to deviate drastically from this purpose".
- 4. p. 9: "The memorandum of October 3 to the Office of Reports and Estimates from the Planning Staff, with an outline similar to Souers', must have been based on the thought ... Authority for underscored words? Actually, this paragraph is all conjecture reasoning from coincidence. I am not disputing to the reasoning, but either more documentation might be in order or else the conjecture admitted as such. "must have been" so often indicates that the speaker really doesn't know, but that he is goddamned well going to ram known his ideas down the listener's throat while holding him down.
- 5. p.11: "That the case must have been effective ... " Same as immediately above. No one has seen Ho Chi Minh for 5 years, which shows that he must have been killed by tuberculosis (which we know he had).
- 6. p.12: "The form which they took, however, was believed by the Office ... to have emanated (?) directly from the NSC". Is "prescribed" meant here?
- 7. p.17: Appendix C and D. Two points: Typists have not labeled them. Second wouldn't it be worth thinking about bringing some of that material into the text to demonstrate the lack of clarity, which is, after all, one of the main themes of the whole paper? Otherwise, the lazy reader has to go and wade through the appendix to see what where is this lack of clarity.
- 8. p.22: Same point as above. The texts (of statements of mission) are apparently there, but do not fill the bill. "No adequate definition of an ORE Mission exists", etc. Why not? Brief statement about the Constitution is excellent, but how to answer the argument OK, there is the Nat. Security Act and statements of function. What's wrong with them. In otherw words, to an outsider the point is well made, but not clearly illustrated.
- 91 p.23: bottom: "that do not conform to a strict interpretation of the basic directives". Not clear to me, because it seems (above) that their whole point is that adequate basic directives are lacking.
- 10. p.28: No footnote sheet for this page, which contains a footnote to a quotation.

(OVER)

## Approved For Release 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-79 1 3 7 NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 3:

- 1. p. 38 "It is interesting, in the light of later developments ... and coordinated with the rest." Any evidence in re why this procedure
  was adopted?, in view of President's letter, etc.? An interesting
  point.
- 2. p. 2: Last paragraph: "The DCI was to be represented ... by his Coordinator whose function would be to settle disagreements that might arise among the members." How?
- 25X1A 3. p. 4: Top. contention that DCI by supplying editors would take some responsibility for final product. Then below: "Souers directed the CPS to appoint a coordinator ... who would act for the Director in his capacity of making decisions when the committee members could not agree."
  - 4. p. 9: Towards bottom: "no department seems to have been willing to cooperate to the extent that its own facilities became fully available to the rest."

Notes 2,3,4 bring up again the question of "coordination" and "responsibility" If the DCI settles disagreements, doesn't he take some responsibility? And yet Parkman says that taking responsibility is going beyond the job of coordinator. Fif the DCI doesn't settle disagreements, how are they settled? All this is not clear to me. If the DCI can't force Agencies to cooperate (p. 9, bottom), how can he settle disagreements (p. 2) or have any capacity for making decisions (p. 4)?

## Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020015-75->

#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 4:

1. p. 5: "interpretative". On p. 9 this appears as "interpretive".

#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 5:

- 1. p. 2: Ambiguities in NIA #1 and NSCID #1? I don't see them seems to me that the statements are pretty clear. The various organizations shall do this and that. Also difference between "enjoin" and "compel". Do you mean here the use of physical force? DCI's right of inspection to take care of "this ommission". What omission? The agencies shall do so-and-so. The only omission I can see is that they don't spell out the penalty for non-compliance. If this is so, shouldn't this whole thing be re-stated in some such terms? Wouldn't some examples of Inglis's historic remarks in the Most Historic Meeting of Rec. 8, 1947, be appropriate here to show graphically the point at issue?
- 2. p. 4: Typist's error: "principal" should be "principle"???
- 3. p. 7: line 2 from top: "impassee" should be "impasse"???
- 4. p. 9-10: Discussion of NSCID #3 and NSCID #1: the point is well taken here. Is there anything in the existence of "escape clauses" in both documents (by agreement with the pertinent agency; as appropriate to their respective responsibilities) to add to strength of agencies' refusal to supply information? In other words, something bedides the agencies' own definitions of "intelligence" and consequent actions?
- 5. No notes on Enclosure to Paper Number 5.

## Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-7 3 >

#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 6:

- 1. p. 5: Center of page: conflict.
- 2. p. 27: Bottome arbitrarily arranged in chronological order. First one is 1948, others in order.
- 3. p. 28: ORE 2# 9-48 (Cuba). This summary is not clear. Did the State Department mean that because Cuba is small its elections could not affect the security of the United States which is so much more powerful than Cuba? Or was the issue drawn in re the embarrassment than to the USP which might increase if the elections went one way rather than another?
- 4. p. 37: line 8 from bottom: "he must have wished..." Why?
- 5. p. 38: line 6 from bottom: "a memorandum (undated but must have been sent after April 17) ..." Why?

#### Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013€₹₹₹

#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 7:

1953.

- 1. p. 1: line 6 from top: "non-interpretative". Dictionary does NOT recognize "interpretive", at least the Winston does not.
- 2. p. 1: line 5 from bottom: Scandinavia.
- 3. p. 4: halfway down the page: northern.
- 4. p. 6: line 5 from bottom: WWW an "extended period of unrest ..."
- 6. p. 9: line 7 from top: the use of Comments apparently became "official" soon after the first one. Cf.k immediately above. Was any of this a question of directives, or just a situation which evolved like Topsy? (grew, to you).

#### Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013/7 3 > NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 8:

- line 7 from bottom: "As an officially uncoordinated publication ..." **b.** 7:
- line 10 from bottom: "evasive" rather than "elusive"???
- line 2 from bottom: "someone who must have perceived..." Evidence? "probably perceived", or "may have perceived" might be better?
- first line after end of quotation at top of page: "It must have occurred to him, why then, does this mm merely perhaps explain subsequent p. 12: .. If it must have occurred to him, why, subsequent action. If it must have xxx occurred to him I should think that it certainly explained his subsequent action. Or, if it prekupan perhaps explained his subsequent action, then it may have occurred to 25X1A him. sem speaking).
  - 5. p. 14: End of first paragraph following end of quotation (top part of page): "Rather, he must have gone according to ... Evidence? He probably did, since his act was in agreement with what Montague recommended. Sorry to keep riding the hobby horse of "must have". Seems, rather doesn't it, rather like trying to serve a Moslem a meal of pig's knuckees??
  - 6. p. 14: Center of page: picayune point no. 1,345,678. "might have become" a turning-point. I should say that the whole incident actually was a turning-point - only the turn was not made. In other words, an issue of great importance did arise and was settled one way instead of another, albeit almost in a fit of absent-mindedness.
  - 7. p. 18: Center of page (under "France"): were not the French and Italian Communist parties in a plurality rather than a majority? (Tax (I've green been to graduate school, Uncle George).
  - p. 19: line 2 from bottom: Trieste.
  - p. 22: bottom line: insistence.

25X1A

25X1A

# Approved For Release 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-7 (ST ? NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 9:

- 1. p. 1: line 6 from top: thesis.
- 2. p. 13: line 3 from bottom: nationalism.
- 3. p. 23: line 7 from bottom: omit "On" (last word in line).
- 4. p. 38: line 5 of the quotation (from the beginning of it), NOT line 5 from the top of the page: unprecedented.
- 5. p. 40: line 7 from top: sphere.
- 6. p. 43: lines 6 10 from top: must have. Any evidence except the logic of the situation. Did they really balance the desirability or, perhaps did they flip a coin? This may be facetious, but was there any evidence that such a debate went on?
- 7.4 p. 53: line 2 from top: "this friendship". Reference is Saudi Arabia, not Ibn Saud.
- 8. p. 53: line 3 from top says "Qavam"; line 7 from top says "Qavan" con-sistency in spelling???
- 9. p. 54-55: bottom line, p. 53 top line, p. 54: "US influence is at a low ebb and an improvement cannot be in the near future." Is this correct, or is there an omission between "be" in and "in"???
- 10. p. 58: lines 9-11 from bottom: "Therefore, as for the US primarily a mean sea and air power, the more defensible positions lay beyond the Asiatic mainland." Shouldn't this read something like: "since the US is primarily a sea and air power..."???
- 11. p. 59: line 4 from top: words "The best" are run together: thebest.
- 12. p. 62: line 3 from bottom: Whrift "drift" is meant?@?
- 13. p. 63: line 6 from top: wrong set of quotation marks around "coalition". Should be 'coalition'.???
- 14. p. 75: FOOTNOTE #3 ON BLUE FOOTNOTE SHEET: "Dutch-Indonesian ... "
- 15. p. 77: center of page: "Syngman Rhee faction" instead of "Rhee Syngman faction"???
- 16. p. 77: center of page: of what was the North Korean government representative??? Not clear to me in what way it was (or would be) more representative than the Rhee government in South Korea.
- 17. p. 78: line 6 from top: "reduceing"??? Is this a mistake in the original text?? If so, shouldn't there be a "sic"??
- 18. Throughout: Some inconsistency in underlining, etc., of passages and title in margins of pages.

- 1. p. 6: lines 6-7 from top: "autonomous".
- 2. p. 6: Topic No. 15 (Basic Dutch Indonesian ...) Did this have an ORE number??
- 3. p. 6: Topic No. 16 (ORE 4/1): word crossed out in pencil.
- 4. p. 13: ORE 47 not underlined, as are others.
- 5. p. ll: CRE 52: words scratched out in pencil.
- 6. p. 17: ORE 39: phrase crossed out in pencil.

Approved For Release 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-7 TO NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 11:

1. None.

### Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-7

#### NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 10:

- 1. p. 10: line 7 from top: "Navysponsored".
- 2. p. 10: line 5 from bottom: note correction made in ink.
- 3. p. 11: line 3 from top: note word exx crossed out in ink and correct word added afterwards.
- 4. p. 30: bottom line: add quotation marks after "conclusions"???
- 5. p. 31: line 6 from top: "said".
- 6. p. 32: bottom line: evidence for this statement?? (i.e., "it was probably one of the first ..."